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Abstract. We revisit the role of instrumental value as a driver of adap-
tive behavior. In active inference, instrumental or extrinsic value is quan-
tified by the information-theoretic surprisal of a set of observations mea-
suring the extent to which those observations conform to prior beliefs or
preferences. That is, an agent is expected to seek the type of evidence
that is consistent with its own model of the world. For reinforcement
learning tasks, the distribution of preferences replaces the notion of re-
ward. We explore a scenario in which the agent learns this distribution
in a self-supervised manner. In particular, we highlight the distinction
between observations induced by the environment and those pertaining
more directly to the continuity of an agent in time. We evaluate our
methodology in a dynamic environment with discrete time and actions.
First with a surprisal minimizing model-free agent (in the RL sense) and
then expanding to the model-based case to minimize the expected free
energy.
Keywords: perception-action loop · active inference · reinforcement
learning · self-regulation · anticipatory systems · instrumental value.
1 Introduction
The continual interaction that exists between an organism and the environment
requires an active form of regulation of the mechanisms safeguarding its integrity.
There are several aspects an agent must consider, ranging from assessing vari-
ous sources of information to anticipating changes in its surroundings. An agent
deciding between different courses of action also factors in potential costs and
benefits derived from its future behavior. This process of selection among differ-
ent value-based choices can be formally described as an optimization problem.
Depending on the formalism, the cost or utility functions being optimized assume
different normative interpretations. In reinforcement learning (RL) for example,
an agent maximizes expected reward guided by a signal provided externally by
the environment in an oracular fashion. The reward in some cases is also comple-
mented with an intrinsic contribution, generally corresponding to an epistemic
dimension of the agent. In active inference, the optimization is framed in terms
of the minimization of the variational free energy to reduce the difference be-
tween sensations and predictions. Instead of rewards, the agent holds a prior
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over preferred future outcomes, thus an agent minimizing its free energy acts to
maximize the occurrence of its preferences and to minimize its own surprisal.
Value arises not as an external property of the environment and instead it is con-
ferred by the agent as a product of the contextual interplay of its own current
configuration and the interpretation of stimuli. Although for living processes we
could think of the priors as emerging and being refined over evolutionary scales,
translating this view into a detailed algorithmic characterization raises impor-
tant considerations because there is no evolutionary prior to draw from. Within
the context of learning and control tasks such as those used in RL, we can find
in the literature recent successes where the tasks are reformulated under the ac-
tive inference framework. The approaches to specify a distribution of preferences
have included for instance, taking the reward an RL agent would receive and
encoding it as the prior [6,7,11,13,14,15], connecting it to task objectives [11]
or through expert demonstrations [2,3,12]. Nonetheless a deeper understanding
is required on how to algorithmically model autonomous goal-driven behavior
when there is no clear way to specify the desired states beforehand, or how can
an agent develop its own in a self-supervised manner. We set to explore these
concerns by considering the case of an agent, that we assume, has a measuring
channel that captures a minimal correlation with the environment. While ini-
tially an ordinary measure, a signal may acquire functional significance as the
agent identifies it as a condition necessary for its continuity in the environment
and learns to associate sensorimotor events to specific outcomes.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Model-free surprisal minimization
Consider an environment whose generative process produces a state st ∈ S at
each time step t resulting in an agent observing ot ∈ O. The agent acts on the
environment with at ∈ A according to a policy pi, obtaining the next observation
ot+1. Suppose the agent performs density estimation on the last t − k observa-
tions to obtain a current set of parameter(s) θt describing pθ(o). As these suffi-
cient statistics contain information about the agent-environment coupling, they
are concatenated with the observations into an augmented state xt = (ot, θt).
Every time step, the agent computes the surprisal generated by a new obser-
vation given its current estimate and then updates it accordingly. In order to
minimize surprisal under this model-free RL setting, the agent should maximize
the expected log of the model evidence E[
∑
t γ
t log pθt(ot)] [1]. Alternatively, we
maintain consistency with active inference by expressing the optimal surprisal
Q-function as,
Qpi∗(x, a) = Epi[− log pθ(o) + γmin
a′
Qpi∗(x
′, a′)] (1)
estimated via DQN [8] or any function approximator with parameters φ such
that Qpi∗(x, a) ≈ Q(x, a;φ).
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2.2 Expected free energy
The free energy principle (FEP) [5] has evolved from an account of message
passing in the brain to propose a probabilistic interpretation of self-organizing
phenomena [10]. Central to current discourse around the FEP is the notion of the
Markov blanket to describe a causal separation between the internal states of a
system from external states, as well as the interfacing blanket states (i.e. sensory
and active states). The FEP advances the view that a system remains out of
equilibrium by maintaining a low entropy distribution of states it occupies during
its lifetime. Correspondingly, the system attempts to minimize the surprisal of an
event at a particular point. For most situations estimating the actual marginal
likelihood is intractable, thus a system can instead minimize the upper bound,
namely the free energy [4] F = Eq(s)[log q(s) − log p(o, s)]. Where p(o, s) is the
generative model and q(s) the variational density approximating hidden causes.
It follows that over an extended temporal dimension, an agent acts according
to a policy pi to minimize the expected free energy (EFE) G for a future step
τ > t. This is expressed as Gτ (pi) = Eq(oτ ,sτ |pi)[log q(sτ |pi) − log p(oτ , sτ |pi)].
Where p(oτ , sτ |pi) = q(sτ |oτ , pi)p(oτ ) is the generative model of the future, thus
G can be rearranged as
Gτ (pi) = −Eq(oτ |pi)[log p(oτ )]− Eq(oτ |pi)[DKL[log q(sτ |oτ , pi)|| log q(sτ |pi)]] (2)
the first and second term represent the instrumental and the epistemic value
respectively. An agent selects a policy with probability q(pi) = σ(−β∑τ Gτ (pi))
where σ is the softmax function and β is the inverse temperature. Given this
process, an agent that performs active inference can minimize its free energy in
two ways: by changing its beliefs about the world or by acting to sample the
regions of the space that conforms to its beliefs.
3 Adaptive control via self-regulation
The concept of homeostasis has played a crucial role in our understanding of
physiological regulation. It describes the capacity of a system to maintain its
internal variables within certain bounds. Recent developments in the FEP de-
scribing the behavior of self-organizing systems under the framework, can be
interpreted as an attempt to provide a formalization of this concept [10]. From
this point of view, homeostatic control in an organism refers to the actions nec-
essary to minimize the surprisal of the values reported by interoceptive channels,
constraining them to those favored by a viable set of states. Crucially, an issue
that is less delineated is how these attracting states come into existence. That
is, how do they emerge from the particular conditions surrounding the system
and how are they discovered among the potential space of signals. It has been
shown that complex behavior may arise by minimizing surprisal in observation
space (i.e. sensory states) without pre-encoded fixed prior distributions [1]. Here
we consider an alternative angle intended to remain closer to the homeostatic
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characterization of a system. For our scenario, the dynamics of the environment
makes it difficult for an agent equipped only with a basic density estimation
capacity, to find the type of regularities in observation space that can sustain
a system in time. In these situations with fast changing dynamics, rather than
minimizing free energy over sensory signals, the agent may instead leverage them
to maintain a low future surprisal of another target variable, implying that it
should remain within a certain expected range. Defining what should constitute
the artificial physiology in simulated agents is not well established. Therefore we
assume the introduction of a channel representing in abstract terms, interocep-
tive signals informing the agent about its continuity in the environment.
3.1 Methods
We assess the behavior of an agent in the Flappy Bird environment (fig. 1 left).
This is a task where a bird must navigate between obstacles (pipes) at different
positions while stabilizing its flight. Despite the apparent simplicity, the envi-
ronment offers a fundamental aspect present in the physical world. Namely, the
inherent dynamics leads spontaneously to the functional disintegration of the
agent. If the agent stops propelling, it succumbs to gravity and falls. At the
same time the environment has a constant scrolling rate, which implies that the
agent cannot remain floating at a single point and cannot survive simply by
flying aimlessly. Originally the task provides a reward every time the bird tra-
verses in between two pipes, however for our case study the information about
the rewards is never propagated and therefore does not have any impact on the
behavior of the agent. The agent receives a feature vector of observations in-
dicating its location and those of the obstacles. In addition, the agent obtains
a measurement indicating its presence in the task (i.e. 1 or 0). This measure-
ment does not represent anything positive or negative by itself, it is simply
another signal that we assume the agent is able to calculate. Similarly to what
is outlined in 2.1, the agent monitors the last t − k values of this measurement
and estimates the density to obtain θt. These become the statistics describing
the current approximated distribution of preferences pθt(m) or p(m|θt). They
are also used to augment the observations to xt = (ot, θt). When the agent
takes a new measurement mt, it evaluates the surprisal against pθt−1(mt). In
this particular case it is evaluated via a Bernoulli density function such that
− log pθt−1(mt) = −(mt log θt−1 + (1−mt) log(1− θt−1)). First, we train a base-
line model-free surprisal minimizing DQN as specified in 2.1 parameterized by
a neural network (NN). Then we examine the behavior of a second agent that
minimizes its expected free energy. Thus the agent learns an augmented state
transition model of the world, parameterized by an ensemble of NNs, and a
surprisal model, also parameterized by another NN. In order to identify an op-
timal policy we apply rolling horizon evolution [9] to generate trajectories and
to associate them to an expected free energy by decomposing equation 2 [13]
Gτ (pi) ≈ −Ep(mτ ,θ|pi)[log p(mτ |pi, θ)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
instrumental value
−H[q(oτ |pi)] + Eq(sτ |pi)
[
H
(
q(oτ |sτ , pi)
)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
salience
−H[q(sτ |pi)] + Eq(φ|pi)
[
H
(
q(sτ |pi, φ)
)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
novelty
(3)
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Fig. 1. Left : The Flappy Bird environment. Center : Performance of an EFE agent.
The left axis indicates the unobserved rewards as reported by the task and the right
axis the number of time steps it survives in the environment. The dotted line shows the
average performance of an SM-DQN after 1000 episodes. Right : Parameter θ in time,
summarizing the intra-episode sufficient statistics of pθ(m).
The expression unpacks further the epistemic contributions to the EFE. The
second and third term refer to the expected reduction in uncertainty about
hidden causes and parameters respectively. For this task o = s, thus only the
first and third term are considered.
3.2 Evaluation
The plot on fig. 1 (center) tracks the performance of an EFE agent in the en-
vironment (averaged over 10 seeds). The dotted line represents the surprisal
minimizing DQN agent after 1000 episodes. The left axis corresponds to the
(unobserved) task reward while the right axis indicates the approximated num-
ber of time steps the agent survives. During the first trials and before the agent
exhibits any form of competence, it was observed that the natural coupling be-
tween agent and environment grants the agent a life expectancy of roughly 19-62
time steps in the task. This is essential as it starts to populate the statistics of
m. Measuring a specific quantity m, although initially representing just another
signal, begins to acquire value due to the frequency that it occurs. In turn,
this starts to dictate the preferences of the agent as it hints that measuring
certain signal correlates with having a stable configuration for this particular
environment. Right fig. 1 shows the evolution of parameter θ (averaged within
an episode) corresponding to the distribution of preferred measurements pθ(m)
which determines the level of surprisal assigned when receiving the next m. As
the agent reduces its uncertainty about the environment it also becomes more
capable of associating sensorimotor events to specific measurements. The behav-
ior becomes more consistent with seeking less surprising measurements, and as
we observe, this reinforces its preferences, exhibiting the circular self-evidencing
dynamics that characterize an agent minimizing its free energy.
4 Discussion
Our main concern was to explore in what conditions a stable set of attracting
states arises, conferring value to observations and leading to the emergence of
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self-sustaining dynamics. The model assumed the capacity of an agent to mea-
sure its operational integrity as it occurs in an organism monitoring its bodily
states. This raises the issue of establishing more principled protocols to define
what should constitute the internal milieu of an agent. A matter of deeper anal-
ysis, also motivated by results in [1], is the role of the environment to provide
structure to the behavior of the agent. For instance, in the environments in [1],
a distribution of preferences is spontaneously built on the assumption that the
initial set of visual observations correlates with good performance on the task.
Here it is the initial set of internal measurements afforded by the environment
that contributes to the formation of a steady state, with the visual features only
informing the actions necessary to maintain it. Future work should also explore
the acquisition of hierarchical behavioral policies when an agent holds prefer-
ences at different levels. For example continual steady states - as presented here,
and as end-goal absorbing states such as those studied in [11].
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